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ABSTRACT Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by 
three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent 
claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration 
must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the 
components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority 
accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of 
descriptions of such cases, provided that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated 
relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi-dimensional and 
how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this 
by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we 
propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also 
captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing 
ideals of respect-based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies. 
 
1. Introduction 
This article concerns some problems that arise in the application of toleration as a 
descriptive concept and respect-based toleration as an evaluative standard to real-life 
cases. There are different understandings of toleration. According to the classical analysis, 
toleration requires three components: (1) an ‘objection component’ or ‘reason for 
interference’ consisting in some negative judgement on the part of one agent towards the 
beliefs or practices of another, a judgement which disposes the former agent to suppress, 
prohibit or otherwise interference with the latter; (2) a power component consisting in 
the first agent actually being able to interfere with the latter; and (3) an ‘acceptance 
component’ or ‘reason for non-interference’ consisting in some positive judgement on 
the part of the first agent which overrides the disposition to interfere.1Toleration actually 
obtains when an agent fulfilling these three conditions does not interfere with the object 
of objection. 
But there are also understandings of toleration other than the classical one. Rather 
than understanding toleration as a certain pattern of action based on certain attitudes, one 
might understand it only to be a matter of attitudes. Toleration then denotes a character 
trait, which might even be a virtue, namely that a person does not hold prejudice against 
others.2 A third possibility is to focus solely on the pattern of action rather than on the 
attitudes behind it. Toleration then denotes the absence of interference, which might 
even be a requirement of justice, and which is ordinarily secured through a system of 
rights and liberties upheld by institutions such as liberal constitutional states. Both 
alternative uses of the term are entirely legitimate and important for specific purposes. 
However, in this article we suggest 1) that the classical concept better captures the 
complexity of certain types of cases involving minority accommodation, and 2) that it is 
therefore still applicable in contemporary liberal democracies. 
Classical toleration is in itself a descriptive concept. Application of the concept as 
sketched does not say anything about whether the attitudes or relations of power are 
good or bad, or whether the agent in question should be tolerant or not. This is 
apparently denied by some theorists, e.g. Rainer Forst, who claims that toleration is a 
‘normatively dependent concept’.3 But the normative dependence of the concept only 
concerns the normative questions about what should be tolerated and whether and when 
toleration is good. Thus, we agree that while there is a basic non-normative concept of 
toleration, beyond that basic concept, toleration needs to invoke further normative 
principles or values. Our point is precisely that the concept in itself lacks any specific 
normative content. Toleration is often advanced as a moral or political requirement, but 
this is then justified on the basis of some further normative ideal, e.g. an ideal of equal 
respect. There are accordingly two questions at stake. One is conceptual: is toleration an 
applicable concept, i.e. can we sensibly and fruitfully describe specific cases in terms of 
toleration? The other is normative: should there be toleration in specific cases and for 
what reasons: is toleration good or even required and why? 
The classical interpretation of toleration seems especially suited to descriptively characterise 
and normatively assess cases involving minority relations. Here we understand 
‘minority’ not just quantitatively, i.e. referring to comparatively small groups, but also 
qualitatively, i.e. referring to groups in society viewed as different and deviant by 
dominant standards.4 Toleration seems an apt concept for describing minority relations, 
since holding minority status consists in being the object of negative attitudes and 
asymmetrical power, and respect-based toleration is a prominent normative proposal for 
how such relations ought to be handled politically. 
Problems arise, however, when one attempts to apply toleration both as a descriptive 
concept and as an evaluative standard to real-life cases of minority accommodation. Our 
example concerns the controversies about mosque-building in European cities, which we 
take to be clear cases of minority accommodation, insofar as Muslims are a minority 
group throughout Europe. Mosque-building permission is often denied, partly or wholly 
(e.g. the Swiss ban on minarets). This is, then, clearly not an instance of toleration, but 
rather of intolerance of mosques. But in other cases, mosques are actually permitted. We 
focus on two such cases from Germany and Denmark. 
The Danish case concerns the two mosque projects in Copenhagen, which were 
processed by the municipal council in parallel from 2009 to 2011. One project for a shia 
Islamic mosque was initiated by the religious community Ahlul Bait, which applied 
for building permission to the municipal council. The other project for a sunni Islamic 
mosque was the result of a requirement made by the municipal council that the 
development of a specific building site should include a representative mosque. The 
organisation The Muslim Council was approached by the municipal building administration 
and the real estate developer for this purpose. Despite these differences, the 
resulting public debate very much treated the two mosque projects as parts of a whole. 
This ‘whole’ was positively defined by proponents of the mosques, including a majority 
in the Council, as a matter of respecting freedom of religion and of furthering integration 
and inclusion, whereas opponents of the projects in the public debate, most prominently 
represented by the Danish People’s Party, framed mosques in general as threats to  
integration, security and public order, and as symbols of undemocratic and ‘un-Danish’ 
values. After prolonged public debate increasingly dominated by opponents of the 
projects, the building applications were finally approved by the municipal council in 
2011. The council had a clear majority in favour and processed the applications as 
standard planning issues, insisting that the national planning act did not permit consideration 
of politicised issues, such as financing from abroad or criticism of Islam, to 
influence the final decision. 
Our argument emerged from an attempt to apply toleration theory to such cases. This 
attempt meets with a problem due to the fact that toleration, as usually defined, concerns 
specific relations. Classical toleration is a relationship between a subject objecting to and 
having power over an object. Real-life cases, e.g. the controversies over the building of 
mosques in Cologne and Copenhagen, almost always involve a multiplicity of relations, 
e.g. both relations between prospective mosque-builders and local councils, and relations 
between civil society pressure groups and Muslim communities, between different 
groups of Muslims, or between engaged citizens and the government. Toleration in such 
cases is not just one relation between one subject and one object; rather, there are several 
subjects even in relation to one single object, and the resulting relations are of different 
types. 
Since the classical concept of toleration can only be applied to a case if one specifies 
the subjects and objects of toleration, application apparently has to be piecemeal, so to 
speak, in the sense that each relation between a specifiable subject and a specifiable 
object must be considered separately.5 A problem, however, arises when one considers 
the outcome of such an exercise: the sum of the single-relation applications of the 
concept or ideals of toleration simply seems not to provide a satisfactory or adequate 
characterisation or evaluation of the case. One might, for instance, end up with a 
description of a case as not involving vertical toleration at all, e.g. if public authorities are 
not really opposed to the mosque-project; or as not involving any social intolerance, if the 
mosque-critical groups have to acquiesce to the building permissions granted. The result 
is that the concept of toleration does not apply to these cases. Our claim is that this is 
both intuitively and theoretically unsatisfactory; these cases often seem to be cases of 
toleration, or even to involve outright intolerance. 
This article offers a theoretical explanation of this mismatch and of why it does not 
show the classical concept to be inapplicable or irrelevant. The multiplicity of relations 
is not just a matter of more relations to be considered, but also makes a qualitative 
difference. The different relations are part of a bigger picture — together they constitute 
‘the case’ understood as a more encompassing issue. Although an abstract construction, 
the concept of ‘the case’ is necessary to make sense of how agents behave and reason. As 
the example from Copenhagen illustrates, the case is the immediate object of debates, in 
relation to which objections are formulated and proposed solutions assessed. But the 
case also forms the background for an understanding of any of the particular relations 
between specifiable agents, e.g. the specific decision of the municipal council to grant a 
building permission to a particular party against a background of opposition from other 
parties. We argue that a theoretically satisfactory approach has to look at the case as a 
whole rather than just at the isolated relations that constitute it. 
Given this theoretical perspective, it is inadequate to look at isolated relations between 
specific agents, as the classical concept of toleration does, since this ignores how they are 
part of a larger network of relationships. This is a theoretical point about the object of 
conceptualisation. But when we extend our focus to the case as a whole, it is clear that 
it not only involves all the elements of classical toleration, i.e. objection, power, and 
acceptance, but that any understanding of the case without attention to these factors 
would be inadequate. Since cases such as this involve all the factors defining classical 
toleration, why not describe these as cases of toleration? 
Our proposal is that such cases should indeed be described as cases of toleration. So 
rather than dispensing with the classical concept and making do with the purely attitudinal 
or purely behavioural-political alternatives, we argue for the continued relevance 
and applicability of the classical concept to such cases. But we do this at another level of 
description than usual: Rather than saying of isolated relations between specific agents 
that they are relations of toleration in the classical sense, we say that, in the intersectionality 
of its multiple dimensions, the case is best understood and described as a case of 
toleration. So even though we retain the components of classical toleration (objection, 
power and acceptance), we apply the concept differently and in a way that does not 
understand it as picking out the internal complexities of the motivation of agents, but the 
multiple features of the broader social and political web of relations affecting one another 
and thus constituting a case of toleration. 
There is a general objection to the attempt to apply classical toleration to cases in 
liberal constitutional states, namely that toleration is not possible in such cases, because 
no agents are free to interfere with citizens’ practices within the space protected by 
constitutional rights. Neither public authorities nor citizens fulfil the power condition in 
cases involving basic rights, which therefore pre-empt toleration.6This is an argument for 
dropping the classical concept of toleration and instead adopting the purely attitudinal 
concept denoting a character trait, which can only be a supererogatory virtue, or a purely 
political concept denoting a regime upholding basic liberty rights (or both). One of 
our claims is that multi-dimensionality and intersectionality show a sense in which the 
classical concept of toleration is still applicable and relevant to cases of minority accommodation, 
since toleration in such cases is not only a matter of social attitudes or 
constitutional rights considered in isolation, but is crucially a matter of their interplay. 
This article is structured as follows: we first explain the multi-dimensionality of 
toleration and lay out the concept of intersectionality. On this basis we argue that 
intersectionality shows how classical toleration is still applicable and relevant to the 
description of cases of minority accommodation in contemporary liberal democracies. 
After that we suggest that intersectionality might also have a normative dimension, which 
we discuss in relation to respect-based justifications of toleration. We then bring all 
these elements together in a discussion of how intersectionality makes a difference for 
the description and assessment of two concrete mosque controversies in Germany and 
Denmark in terms of toleration. Even though our argument is mainly theoretical (concerned 
with the concept and the justification for toleration) it has emerged from the 
attempt to apply toleration theory to these cases. These illustrations both exemplify and 
make concrete our theoretical ideas and indicate how our theoretical points are relevant 
to the application of toleration theory to particular cases. 
 
2. Dimensions of Toleration: Vertical and Horizontal 
Toleration may be applied to cases along different dimensions depending on who the 
subjects and objects of toleration and respect are. Relations are vertical if the subject is 
the state or some public authority and the objects are citizens or groups in society within 
the jurisdiction and regulative power of the authority. Relations are horizontal if both the 
subject and objects are citizens or societal groups.7 
Vertical or political toleration is characterised by the subject of toleration having 
political power over the object of toleration. This is traditionally associated with the 
‘permission’ conception of toleration,8 in which absolutist confessional states only conceded 
qualified and conditional permission to religious minorities to live according to 
their beliefs and practices. 
Horizontal toleration refers to relationships in civil society where citizens dislike or 
object to the practices of other citizens. In a just liberal democratic society all citizens 
have equal rights and freedoms and no group should be able to dominate others. Thus 
all groups have to put up with disliked practices of other groups as long as these do not 
violate any rights. There is still room, however, for horizontal toleration. This is because 
horizontal toleration is social not only in the sense that it concerns relations between 
societal groups, but also insofar as the power involved is social rather than political. Some 
citizens are richer and live in wealthier areas than others, who are pushed to live in 
ghettoes. The values and lifestyles of some groups are deeply embedded in the history of 
a country where others are newcomers. Factors like these illustrate how, even under a 
political regime of freedom and equality, there may still be unequal social power.9 
 
3. Descriptive Intersectionality 
Vertical and horizontal relations could in principle be completely isolated from each 
other. The multiplicity of relations might not make any difference. In the case of 
mosque-controversies, popular dislike of minarets and disapproval of Islam expressed in 
protest initiatives might, for instance, make no difference to the way in which public 
authorities relate to mosques. 
But even if vertical relations are unaffected by horizontal relations, the stance of the 
public authorities is likely to make a difference to the way in which the horizontal 
relations are played out. If authorities simply remain aloof regarding popular objections, 
this might weaken these reasons for objection, or it might strengthen them, e.g. if 
opponents of mosques make use of the public authorities’ indifference to mobilise 
further opposition. And even if objections in horizontal relations are unaffected, relations 
of power surely are not: how public authorities decide to handle a given case, e.g. 
whether or not they permit the building of a mosque, affects how citizens and civil 
society pressure groups can act. 
So even though relations in multi-dimensional cases could in principle be characterised 
in isolation, we suggest that the interpretation of multi-dimensional real-life cases 
has to take an alternative integrated approach. This means that the description of a case 
in terms of toleration a) acknowledges the multi-dimensionality of relations of toleration, 
and b) considers how multidimensionality affects the interpretation of the case as a 
whole. 
The second feature of an integrated approach is concerned with what we call 
intersectionality, i.e. the way in which multi-dimensionality is not only a matter of there 
being more than one relation of toleration in a given case, but that the case cannot 
be adequately described in terms of toleration and/or cannot adequately be assessed 
normatively in terms of ideals of toleration without attention to the other dimensions.10 
The idea is that relations intersect or interrelate in ways that make a difference for how 
the conditions for toleration can be understood, and/or for what the reasons for toleration 
actually justify or require, in a specific case. 
Intersectionality is the reason for taking up an integrated approach in relation 
to multi-dimensional cases; without intersectionality, multi-dimensionality could be 
adequately addressed by engaging with each relation in a given case in isolation from 
each of the other relations in the case. But given intersectionality, an integrated approach 
is necessary to capture multi-dimensional cases adequately. 
Types of intersectionality differ depending on whether they concern the description of 
a case as a case of toleration or the normative assessment of a case on the basis of some 
ideal or requirement of toleration. Descriptive intersectionality obtains when interpreting 
or characterising a given case in terms of toleration requires that the intersections of 
different dimensions of toleration are addressed. 
Descriptive intersectionality concerns the application of a concept to a case. But there 
might be different reasons why the concept of toleration applies to a multi-dimensional 
case. One is that one relation affects another empirically; for instance horizontal objections 
causally influence the deliberations of the municipal council so that one cannot 
understand why the council reasons and acts as it does without reference to the horizontal 
objections. Intersectionality might furthermore be diachronic in the sense that 
opposition and acceptance need not obtain synchronically. Even if the council decides to 
permit the building of a mosque, which means that horizontal objections did not succeed 
in swaying the decision, it might have set the agenda for the decision, which will 
subsequently be understood against this background.Thus intersectionality will often be 
broader than empirical causation: if the instantiation in the case of the different components 
of toleration all affect the significance of the case, then there will be a reason for 
describing it as one of toleration even if, for example, the horizontal objections did not 
in fact causally affect the vertical decisions made. Intersectionality is then a conceptual 
matter which concerns what it means to understand a case as one of toleration. 
 
4. The Applicability and Relevance of Classical Toleration 
Cases of minority accommodation in contemporary constitutional liberal democracies 
often involve controversies over the interpretation and limits of established rights and 
norms as applied to minority groups. Cases about mosque-building in Europe, for 
instance, involve constitutional rights to freedom of religion and legal norms of nondiscrimination. 
But this leads to an objection to viewing such cases in terms of classical 
toleration. The objection is that constitutional rights pre-empt toleration, since no agents 
in a constitutionally regulated scenario have the power to interfere with acts or practices 
protected by basic rights.11 
One might respond that these cases are nevertheless cases of toleration since they 
concern the extent of freedom enjoyed by citizens. Liberal constitutionalism provides a 
regime of toleration because it secures non-interference with acts or practices despite the 
dislike or disapproval hereof by others, and because it is justified as a way of preventing 
intolerance.12 But even if a case concerns the limits of the freedom granted to minorities, 
this does not in itself show that it is a case of toleration. The limits in question are only 
limits of toleration if acts taking place within these limits are acts of toleration. But the 
objection is precisely that this is not the case: no one has the power to interfere within 
these limits, so the non-interference secured by constitutional rights is not a form of 
toleration. 
We suggest that there are two ways of understanding the noted response to the 
objection: one is simply to say that toleration means something different in modern 
liberal democracies. The classical model of toleration is inapplicable and irrelevant in 
relation to modern liberal democracies. This is in principle fine, but leaves unanswered 
the question why we should still use the same term to describe these cases; why not just 
dispense with the term ‘toleration’ altogether and focus purely on constitutional rights, 
e.g. on freedom of religion? Is there still any non-redundant similarity between classical 
and modern cases that warrants using the same term to describe and discuss them? 
This leads to our alternative response: the classical analysis of toleration still applies, 
although in a more complicated way, which has to be spelled out. The fact that contemporary 
cases of minority accommodation are often concerned with the limits of constitutional 
rights protection does not in itself show that they are cases of toleration. But this 
does not mean that the classical analysis of toleration is inapplicable. The applicability 
turns, however, on the complexity of these types of cases. This is why we have introduced 
the notions of multi-dimensionality and intersectionality. Our claim is that, when one 
takes multi-dimensionality and intersectionality into account, there is still a reason to 
characterise these types of cases taken as wholes in terms of classical toleration. As our 
examples show, even though classical toleration may indeed often be inapplicable to the 
single relations taken in isolation, when one considers the integrated whole of these 
relations, they display all the features uniquely picked out by classical toleration. 
In this way, we agree that the focus should be on the regime as a whole rather than on 
single, isolated agents of toleration. But our point is that, when one considers cases as 
wholes, classical toleration may still apply. Furthermore, there are good reasons to retain 
the classical concept, when applicable, because it captures more aspects of such cases 
than a redefined concept of toleration. And these aspects are precisely the ones that make 
the cases interesting. 
 
5. Normative Intersectionality 
Normative intersectionality concerns the evaluation of cases from the point of view of 
normative reasons for toleration, i.e. specific justifications for considering toleration as 
good or required. When considering descriptively complex cases, normative intersectionality 
obtains if justifying reasons for toleration require considering the case has a 
whole. 
A test for intersectionality is to compare two scenarios, where a given relationship 
holds in both, but where it is complemented with another relationship in the second 
scenario. If the addition of the second relationship makes a difference to our assessment 
of the first, then we have a case of intersectionality. 
Whether or not certain relations can or cannot be evaluated in isolation depends on 
the normative ideal one endorses. Since most justifications positively evaluate relationships 
of toleration as furthering some other values (such as peace, equal respect, freedom 
of conscience), the contribution of one dimension to that value must be considered in 
combination with the impact of other dimensions. 
Normative theories that acknowledge multidimensionality assess cases on the basis 
of reasons for toleration by addressing several dimensions together and the way they 
intersect. Ignoring that would lead to an evaluative mistake, in the same way that it would 
be a mistake, say, to order a drink without first considering what you are going to eat, if 
your goal is to maximise taste, and the taste of food depends on the drink that accompanies 
it. Similarly if, say, pacific cohabitation among groups is affected by the relationship 
between groups and the political authority, a sound normative evaluation based on 
modus vivendi should consider both relationships in their intersection. 
The existence and features (what sort of relations are relevant for the evaluation of a 
case) of normative intersectionality depend on the justification of toleration. In order to 
understand how intersectionality may work, we will focus on a conception of respectbased 
toleration. 
Several authors13 have proposed that this is the only conception of toleration that is not 
only compatible with, but also actually required by, justice. People show equal respect 
when they reciprocally recognise one another as morally free and equal, despite differences, 
e.g. in their conceptions of the good. In this way, political acceptance (in the form 
of recognising equal rights and liberties) can be coupled with ethical disapproval of or 
contempt for others’ conceptions of the good.14 
In our interpretation, equal respect is not simply a means of securing a narrow formal 
equality, but demands a wider ‘qualitative equality’ among different groups in society, 
which aims at the full inclusion of minorities as equal participants in the political 
community.15 On the basis of equal respect, minorities are not merely permitted to 
persist; rather, they are granted public toleration as a means to overcome the unjust 
aspects of their minority status. 
Understood in this way, respect-based toleration not only assesses vertical and horizontal 
relations together, but also considers them as cases of intersectional toleration in 
the descriptive sense introduced earlier. While each relation taken in isolation may not be 
a relation of toleration, together they can not only be characterised as such, but should 
also be normatively assessed as such. This assessment proceeds on the basis of the 
requirement of equal respect, but this should not be applied to single relations taken in 
isolation; rather it is the interplay of these relations that determines whether a case lives 
up to the requirement of equal respect. 
The notion of equal respect can and should of course be further spelled out and 
defended, and there are obviously various ways of doing this. For the purpose of the 
present article we do not argue for the ideal of equal respect, but merely use it as an 
illustration of a multi-dimensional and intersectional approach. 
How respect-based toleration gives rise to normative intersectionality can be explained 
by highlighting what the value of toleration consists in, according to the respect conception. 
Toleration in a purely descriptive sense consists in non-interference.16 However, 
the value of toleration, according to the respect-conception, is not merely the value of 
non-interference. Non-interference might of course be valuable, e.g. because it leaves the 
receiver of toleration with negative freedom. But not all infringements of negative 
freedom are violations of equal respect, so the value of toleration according to the 
respect-conception cannot be explained by the value of negative freedom. 
In order to understand the value of respect-based toleration, consider first that in 
liberal democracies, equal respect is cashed out vertically in terms of citizen rights. But 
such rights are not only a matter of not actually being interfered with. The value of such 
rights also concerns one’s security in not being interfered with (being free in the sense of 
not being vulnerable to arbitrary interference17) and having a certain legal status. In a 
liberal society, justice not only requires that minority groups are not interfered with in 
certain respects, but that their members are recognised as full and equal citizens. So 
toleration has to be an institutional principle rather than a discretionary act on the part of 
people in power. 
Secondly, there is an even broader, non-institutional issue. According to equal respect 
positions concerned with equal social status, formal rights are not sufficient for justice; 
minorities also have to be recognised as full and equal citizens.18 Recognition is necessary 
to secure a society of equals where no group is a qualitative minority in the sense that its 
members are systematically regarded as less than full members of society. Toleration is 
therefore not just a matter of actual non-interference, but also concerns the broader 
institutional system of rights and the social status ideally expressed by it. From this 
perspective, toleration is part of the recognition of minorities as full citizens. 
In cases such as the mosque controversies, the value to Muslims of being granted 
building permission for a representative mosque is not merely or primarily the opportunity 
to worship that the resulting big mosque will provide. Muslims often already have 
the opportunity to worship in many smaller ‘cellar mosques’. The value is instead related 
to public visibility and recognition of Muslims as full and equal citizens that such 
permission might express, and thereby to the respect for Muslims as equal citizens. 
Multi-dimensionality is relevant in such cases because non-acceptance in one dimension 
may be an obstacle to achieving the further aims required for equal respect in other 
dimensions. Even if public authorities actually grant permission to build mosques and 
acknowledge that a reason to do this is that Muslims have the same rights (including 
freedom of religion) as others, this may not affect the minority status of Muslims if there 
is still sufficiently widespread opposition to mosques at the social level—even if the legal 
permission means that social groups disapproving of mosques have no direct power to 
prevent mosques from being built. And conversely: full social acceptance will of course 
not be enough, if a group is still denied equal legal rights. This is not simply the claim that 
we should add considerations of relative social power to those of political power, but the 
idea that they affect one another and should therefore be evaluated together. 
So even if one could in principle consider different issues of toleration (e.g. institutional 
and social toleration) separately for the purpose of assessing the degree of interference 
and negative freedom, the normative reasons to be concerned with toleration 
require an integrated approach in cases where equal respect is a function of both 
dimensions together. 
The respect conception prescribes equal respect as a function of both vertical and 
horizontal power relationships. Whenever a specific case exhibits descriptive intersectionality, 
an evaluation in terms of respect must also take into consideration how the 
relative power resulting from those intersectionalities affects the status of citizens. 
 
6. Intersectionalities of Toleration 
In order to show that classical toleration is still both applicable and relevant, but in 
a way requiring attention to descriptive intersectionality, recall the Danish debate 
about the two mosque projects in Copenhagen.19 According to the case description 
in Section 1, procedural constraints seem to pre-empt vertical toleration, and the 
actual permission seems to pre-empt horizontal toleration. Such an interpretation fails, 
however, to consider the case as a whole. While isolated relations in the case may not 
qualify as relations of toleration, the public debate about the mosque projects treated 
Muslims as an undifferentiated group and the so-called ‘grand-mosques’ as a unitary 
problem, despite the differences between Muslim groups and between the two mosque 
projects. This is a crucial aspect, which is lost if one approaches the case in a piecemeal 
fashion taking each relationship in isolation. Like so many other contemporary cases of 
minority accommodation, this case is therefore very much about a general minoritymajority 
relationship, not just about what particular constitutional rights, e.g. freedom 
of religion, require or prohibit in relation to particular building applications. To 
capture the case, one has to include both the general minority issue and the particular 
legal-administrative decisions. 
If one considers these elements together, and thus takes the case as a whole, all 
components of classical toleration are present: there is dislike and disapproval, power 
and acceptance. These are distributed, so to speak, across the different agents involved. 
But when one considers the case as a whole, the different aspects nevertheless become 
relevant to each other. Even though the decision about whether to give building permission 
is formally constrained by the national planning act and background constitutional 
guarantees, the debate about this decision, both in the media, in the municipal council 
and even in parliament, was dominated by other issues all related to Muslims as a 
minority. So even though the actual permissions given are arguably not acts of toleration 
considered in a narrow legal perspective, it is artificial to abstract away from the societal 
context in which these decisions were taken and debated. The addition of this factor 
makes it reasonable to interpret the decisions as acts of toleration in the wider sense that 
the authorities with power to grant such permissions do so despite widely propagated 
popular objections to mosques. 
Insofar as the case is just as much an articulation of a general minority-majority 
relation as one about particular building permissions, there are furthermore additional 
forms of power at stake. Power here means not only the legal authority to issue permissions, 
but also the social power to frame the mosque issue in a particular way — e.g. the 
power to represent Muslims as a unitary group and all mosques as raising security 
problems. Even though mosque opponents did not in fact have the power to prevent 
building permission from being granted, when viewing the case from the perspective of 
social power, it is reasonable to interpret it as also involving intolerance. Indeed, the 
opponents did have the power to frame the case in a way that reinforced the minority 
status of Muslims. This social power was exercised effectively in that opponents of 
mosques were successful in keeping the focus on issues that were formally irrelevant to 
decisions under the planning act. Opponents were able to question the permissibility of 
mosques and keep these issues on the public agenda even though constitutional and 
procedural guarantees should make such issues irrelevant. 
This opposition to mosques might, taken on its own, be interpreted as a form of dislike 
of mosques, and thus as a form of intolerance in the purely attitudinal sense. But, again, 
the agenda-setting power and the framing of Muslims and mosques as problematic 
were not isolated from the decisions about building permission. To avoid an artificially 
selective view of the case, horizontal opposition and vertical permission should therefore 
be considered together. Then all the components of classical toleration are present. 
One objection to our intersectional approach might be that it renders toleration 
subject-less in the sense that, from an integrated perspective focused on intersectionality, 
toleration is not tied to particular identifiable agents, but dispersed over a number of 
different agents and relations in a case. Thus, intersectional toleration does not capture 
the pattern of attitudes in single agents.This objection misses the point of our approach, 
which extends the analytical focus to the case as a whole rather than limiting it to the 
identification of a single (in)tolerant agent. In particular, note first that the narrow and 
wide perspectives are not mutually exclusive; if one takes up a wide, integrated approach 
focused on intersectionality, this does not preclude also examining particular agents and 
relations in a more narrow perspective, e.g. in terms of social power. So our proposal 
represents a supplementary rather than a competing interpretative perspective. What is 
more, our point, which we have exemplified with reference to the Danish case, is that 
there are often cases where the narrow, agent-centred perspective simply is not applicable 
or fails to capture the relevant features of cases, in particular the interconnectedness 
of agents and their different relations, which intuitively make them cases of toleration. In 
this respect we partly accept the criticisms levelled at classical toleration, according to 
which features of liberal constitutional states often pre-empt toleration. We further claim, 
however, that this is not a reason for abandoning classical toleration in favour of purely 
attitudinal or institutional conceptions, since these omit relevant and interesting features 
of such cases. Our proposal of a wide, integrated approach which applies classical 
toleration to whole cases is an attempt to show how it is still possible to capture these 
additional features within a single conceptual framework. 
The Copenhagen mosque case thus illustrates how such an integrated approach makes 
classical toleration relevant. It is a case of intersectionality, because the vertical and 
horizontal relations in the case affect each other conceptually in that, even though they 
are not relations of classical toleration when taken in isolation, they together instantiate 
all the components required for classical toleration. Furthermore, this wider perspective 
on the case seems relevant because narrower and more isolated perspectives ignore what 
was important about the case both in the dominant public debate and framing of the 
case and in terms of the resulting social relations. In this sense, a multi-dimensional 
approach focused on intersectionality is not only possible but also necessary to 
adequately interpret the case. 
One might accept that both vertical and horizontal relations should be considered 
together in this sort of case, but nevertheless deny that this calls for a general idea of 
multi-dimensionality and intersectionality; perhaps there is only one type of intersectionality, 
i.e. between vertical and horizontal relations, which is not an instance of a more 
general phenomenon. This would be simplifying matters again, for the interpretation of 
cases in terms of vertical and horizontal relations is not invariant across cases. ‘Vertical’ 
and ‘horizontal’ might denote different sorts of relations in different cases, and even a 
single case might involve different sorts of more or less vertical relations. A case in point 
is the German controversy about the building of a mosque in Cologne-Ehrenfeld. In this 
case, religious actors other than the Muslim communities involved also played a role. 
Christian churches (Evangelical and Catholic) also took part in the debate through the 
involvement of their representatives. In Germany these churches are recognised as 
‘corporations of public law’ — they are neither organisations of civil society like voluntary 
associations, nor public authorities like municipal councils, but are invested with 
public functions, e.g. in education, social work and health care. Muslim communities do 
not enjoy this kind of status since they are not regarded as appropriately ‘permanent’, 
representative and democratic, according to Article 40 of the Basic Law.20 This makes 
the relationships between the Christian churches and other actors involved in the case 
different from both ‘purely’ vertical and ‘purely’ horizontal relations. Intersectionality 
therefore cannot be assumed to take the same form in all cases. 
Because of their different legal status, the relationships between Christian representatives 
and the representatives of the DITIP, the Muslim civic association involved in 
building the mosque, was not a relationship among peers (and thus not horizontal). 
Rather, the churches played a transversal role. The intervention of the churches shows on 
the one hand their willingness to dialogue with other religious groups, but on the other 
hand — given their legal and social position — their willingness to act as intermediaries 
between public authorities and the Muslim associations. This role shows a clear awareness 
of their status as well-established groups in the country as compared with new 
religions. The churches’ contribution to the public debate was mainly to stress and 
defend the value of freedom of religion in a time of progressive secularisation of society, 
and was thus favourable to mosque-building permission. However, some more specific 
interventions, such as that of BishopWolfgang Huber during the Evangelischer Kirchentag 
in Cologne (May 2007), were aimed at raising the question of the reciprocity of the 
treatment of Christians in countries of Muslim majority, in particular in Turkey. Drawing 
such a comparison between the status of Muslims in Germany and that of Christians in 
Turkey frames the problem of building permission as the concession of established 
groups that are in the position of tolerating other groups. 
 
7. Intersectional Respect 
We have argued that the concept of toleration may be appropriate in describing cases of 
majority-minority relationships if we apply an intersectional conception of toleration. We 
argue additionally that intersectionality is relevant from a normative point of view. 
Respect-based toleration prescribes toleration when it promotes both equal rights and 
liberty and grants recognition to the groups that are marginalised in society. Full respect 
can only be achieved by considering all the dimensions that contribute to the configuration 
of a society of equals. For present purposes we neither endorse any specific 
conception of equal respect nor do we make any all things considered assessments of the 
mosque cases. We merely use an ideal of equal respect to illustrate that intersectionality 
is required not only for identifying and locating the problem where it really is but also for 
tracking all the aspects that are normatively relevant to the ideal of respect. 
In the case of Cologne-Ehrenfeld,21 one assessment may for instance be that building 
permission is required by freedom of religion. Indeed, the original project of an oriental style 
mosque was accepted by the municipality on these terms. Yet, as the project 
unfolded and was publicly discussed, objections to the mosque plans were not spelled 
out in terms of freedom of religion. Indeed, in Germany surveys show that most people 
do not object to the freedom for Muslims to practice their religion (for example in ‘cellar 
mosques’), yet they contest the visibility of mosques and the significance of their visibility 
in reinforcing the status of Muslims in the German society.22 In the Cologne case a 
crucial question in the public debate concerned the proportions of the mosque, its 
integration in the urban landscape, and its significance in relation to the visibility of 
Islam and the status of Muslims in relation to the wider German society and its values. 
In order to understand the normative salience of granting building permission for a 
representative mosque, it seems restrictive to appeal to freedom of religion only, since the 
status of Muslim values and life style and the public visibility of Islam are the core 
reasons for rejection expressed on a societal level. Failure to consider these objections in 
interpreting the controversy misses an important normative dimension of the case, which 
has to do with intergroup relations. As already remarked, Muslims are constructed as a 
qualitative minority insofar as they are marked as newcomers and often as a threat to 
German standards of social behaviour, for example in the treatment of women. Equal 
respect of course requires some amount of non-interference of specific actors (e.g. by the 
opponents of mosques once permission is granted in the cases discussed), but this may 
not be a matter of toleration when considered in isolation, since toleration here is 
pre-empted by the legal framework. Yet the granting of rights (e.g. ensuring freedom of 
religion) and the offering of symbolic forms of recognition (e.g. not only permitting a 
mosque to be built, but a representative mosque) affect each other normatively and should 
therefore be considered together. Thus, the ideal of respect, by assigning value both to 
citizens’ mutual regard of one another as equals, and as being entitled to equal rights and 
liberties, is able to grasp the interdependence between the question of building permission 
and the status of Muslims as a minority. The notion of respect highlights the impact 
of building permissions both in terms of freedom and of the recognition of Muslims. 
It is precisely because the case is describable as one of intersectional toleration that the 
normative assessment in terms of equal respect must also address these intersectionalities, 
for instance by highlighting the importance of the public visibility of a representative 
mosque. Both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions, and how these together 
instantiate equal respect (or fail to do so), have be to be considered for the normative 
assessment. 
Our claim that normative assessments on the basis of some ideals involve normative 
intersectionality is primarily a theoretical point about the structure of such assessments. 
But it might also make a normative difference in the sense that it provides an answer to 
objections to policies. Objections to representative mosques on the basis that they are not 
required to secure Muslims’ ability to worship may for instance be countered by noting 
that the case is not only about freedom of religion in the sense of ability to worship, but 
also about equal respect in a broader sense, and that public visibility is required to secure 
this wider goal. 
Normative intersectionality does not provide an additional argument beyond what 
proponents of equal respect can already say. It does not specify how exactly the various 
relationships should be evaluated as a whole. To clarify this is a task for normative 
theories of respect. However, a focus on intersectionality does make clear that equal 
respect cannot be assessed when considering isolated relations only. Thus normative 
intersectionality both shows how the descriptive multi-dimensionality of cases may also 
be normatively relevant given some normative ideals, and provides a formulation of how 
it is relevant that might be of use in practical arguments. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The present article has considered toleration as a descriptive concept for characterising 
cases and respect-based toleration as a normative ideal or requirement. Since toleration 
denotes social relations which involve difference, dislike or disagreement, and power, it 
is especially suited to characterising and assessing cases involving minority relations. We 
have proposed that the application of toleration theory to cases of minority accommodation 
needs to acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of toleration, i.e. that toleration 
cases often involve multiple social relations with different agents and different forms 
of power. Our central claim is that different relations should be taken together when 
characterising or evaluating cases in terms of toleration, since such a wide perspective 
alerts us to what we have called intersectionality. Intersectionality explains why an 
isolated or piece-meal analysis or evaluation of cases is often inadequate. We hope to have 
exemplified the sense of intersectionality and to have shown its relevance. 
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